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surrogacy law and its potential development in the UK' (2010) 2 King's
Student LR 37 at 48-9).
In temis of the process we recommend for South Africa, after its review
the proposed panel should prepare a psychological and medical report,
together with a recommendation regarding confirmation of surrogacy. for
submission to court. This would assist by overcoming the problem (noted in
1W711) of slanted evidence. It would also obviate the need to postpone matters
due to insufficient evidence as happened in Three Ageemen ts. If the panel
recommends against confirmation, its evidence should be subject to cross-
examination by applicants in court. An advantage of including some neutral
evidence is that it creates a more effective function for high court judges.
They will no longer be expected to assume the role of inest otors with
inadequate means in realms where they are not appropriately -trained.
Rather, they will utilise their legal training along familiar lines as evaluators of
evidence and arbiters of disputes.
That surrogacy arrangements are sometimes made in situations of no
pre-existing relationship between parties and overwhelming desire for a child
strengthens the argument for enabling neutral expert evidence from an
appropriately trained panel (Anderson op cit at 48). Under the current
simplistic chapter 19 procedure, courts have a very diffictult task. The fact that
they must rely on evidence from sources which are not neutral increases the
risk of inappropriate confimiations. The result, of course, may be serious
physical, emotional and psychological harm to one or more of those con-
cemed. Involving a panel as we propose would greatly reduce this risk. It
would create legitimate expectations, remove uncertainty and ensure greater
compliance with surrogacy agreements.
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPROVAL OF SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD AGREEMENTS: EXB4RTE WH
ELSJE BONTHUYS
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In 2011 the North and South Gauteng High Courts were approached to
confirm surrogate motherhood agreements in accordance with the provi-
sions of chapter 19 of the Children's A t 38 of 2005. The judgments were
reported as In Re Confiation of Three Surrogate alotherhood Agreeeints 2011
(6) SA22 (GSJ) and Ex parte 14FI2011 (6) SA514 (GNP). This note concems
the latter judgment.
Because the provisions regulating surrogacy first became operative in April
2010, the cases represented an opportunity to provide guidance on the
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approach to be followed by c.ourts who are asked to confirm surrogate
motherhood agreements. (See also Lize Mills 'Certainty about surrogacy'
(2010) 21 Stellenbosch LR 429 for a discussion of an unreported decision of the
North Gauteng High Court in case no 30972/2009 and of the history of the
legal re gulation of surrogacy.) The Deputy Judge President specifically
instructed the court in Ex parte WVH to formulate guidelines on how this new
area of law should be handled in future, and invited several amici to make
submissions in this regard (paras 9 and 10).
Chapter 19 of the Children's Act provides the first statutory regulation of
surrogate motherhood - a practice which, it is often said, has existed since
biblical times (para 2). 'The Act sets out the requirements for a valid surrogate
motherhood agreement, which include a written surrogacy agreement
between the comnissioning parent(s) on the one hand, and the proposed
surrogate mother and her spouse or partner on the other hand (s 292). This
agreement must be confirmed by a high court in accordance with the criteria
set out in s 295, which relate to the suitability of the comnnissioning parents,
the suitability of the surrogate, and the best interests of the child to be born
from the arrangement. The first substantive part of our discussion relates to
the court's disctssion of the suitability of the commissioning parents, who
were a married gay couple. We argue that, in attempting to treat the
conmmissioning parents the same as it would opposite-sex parents, the court
failed adequately to articulate the notion of substantive equality and to show
an understanding of the lived realities of same-sex couples.
Also important for the purposes of this note is the statutory requirement
that the court confirming the surrogacy agreement must be satisfied that the
surrogate 'is not using surrogacy as a source ofincome' (s 295 (c)(iv)). Further,
s 301(2) prohibits commercial surrogacy by providing that no compensation
may be paid to the surrogate mother, apart from expenses relating to
fertilisation and other medical expenses for pregnancy and birth, 'loss of
earnings suffiered by the surrogate mother as a result of the surrogate
motherhood agreement', and health, death and disability insurance related to
the surrogacy. Compensation may also be paid to professionals who provide
bona fide medical or other services in relation to the surrogacy (s 295(3)).
These provisions limiting commercial surrogacy nust be read together with
s 60(4) () of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, which renders it a criminal
offence to trade in gametes, and decrees that a person may not receive
compensation for a gamete, except for reinibursenents of reasonable costs
incurred in the process of donation. What the Children's Act allows,
therefore, is altruistic surrogacy - undertaken for compassionate reasons -
while clearly prohibiting surrogacy undertaken for commercial reasons. The
second substantive part of our discussion deals with the treatment of com-
mercial surrogacy in Ex parte 17H. Our argument is that the court failed to
deal decisively with the strong indications of commercial surrogacy which
arise from the facts of the case, instead simply assuming that this was a case of
altruistic surrogacy. 'This failure contradicts the clear purpose of the legisla-
tion and sets a precedent which c ould open the door for widespread
conmiercial surrogacy in future.
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Our note is not concerned with the question whether commercial
surrogacy should, as a matter of policy, be permitted. There are strong
arguments to be made both for allowing and for prohibiting commercial
surrogacy, which could be considered in a different contribution. However,
for the purposes of this note, it is sufficient to recognise that thes argumients
were considered by the South African Law Reform Commission (e, g South
African Law Commission Project 65 Report on Surrogate Motherhood (1993)
and South African Law Commission Project 110 Report on the R view of the
Child Care Act (2002) and by Parliament in its debates about the Children's
Bill, and that the resulting policy is embodied in the Children's Act. Our
argument is the limited proposition that the judgment in Ex parte W'H
undermines the provisions of the Children's Act which expressly prohibit
commercial surrogacy, or at least fails to pursue this policy with sufficient
rigour.
THE JUDGMENT IN EX B4RTE WIH
Ex parte W'H concerned an application for the confirmation of a surrogacy
agreement. The commissioning parents were a married gay couple. The
surrogate mother and her life partner were joined as parties. The parties were
introduced to one another by an agency, baby2mnom. The presence of an
agency led the court to require additional affidavits on the process followed
by and the compensation paid to the agency in order to ensure that the
surrogacy was not of a commercial nature (para 12). In response, the founder
of baby2mnom filed a supplementary affidavit, stating that she was fully aware
of the prohibition of commercial surrogacy and that the agency's only source
of income was derived from egg-donation services (paras 12, 18 and 24). The
commissioning couple also supplied additional information, including the
estimated payments to the surrogate mother.
In ascertaining the suitability of the commissioning couple to become
parents, the court noted that they had no children of their own, and that
'both being male persons are incapable of having children that are genetically
related to them except via the process of surrogacy' (para 16). The couple had
entered into a surrogate agreement prior to the one which formed the subject
of this application, which was also confirmed by the court, but the first
surrogacy agreement did not result in a pregnancy because the surrogate
mother became ill.
FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
The first fundamental constitutional right which is relevant to this judgment
is the right to equality and the concomitant right not to be discriminated
against on the basis of sexual orientation, sex or gender (s 9(3) of the
Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica, 1996).
The apparently straightforward concept of equality is conceptually com-
plex when applied in law (Rikki Holtmaat 'The concept of discrimination' 2.
Unpublished paper presented at the 2004 Academy of European Law
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Conference, Trier, Germany, available at http:/www eraint/web/en
resources/5 1095 2953_file en. 4193.pdt). For the purpose of our critique of
the judgment in Ex parit -I, the crucial distinction is that between formal
and substantive equality. Formal equality entails treating all people the same,
regardless of social or economic circumstances, while substantive equality
aims to achieve equal outcomes and results by taking account of social and
other contexts in which people live (I Currie & J de Waal (eds) Tie Bill of
Riphts Handbook 5 ed (2005) 233.) The jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Court on sexual orientation has been partictularly influential in articulating
the significance of social context, the continued effects of past discriminatory
practices and the influence of negative stereotypes upon the achievement of
substantive equality. Indeed, the court in Ex parte 4fH referred to a number
of these cases in support of its approach towards equality (para 54.1 and fn
19). However, in the application of substantive equality to the facts of this
case, we argue, the court can be found lacking.
Two paragraphs in Ex parte 111l illustrate the court's approach to equality
in relation to se'xual orientation. In paragraph 54.1 the court held:
'As South African law recognises heterosexual as well as sarne sex civil
nmariages, and in the light of the fact that no discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation is allowed, sarne sex couples must be treated in exactly the saie
1anner as any heterosexual couples, and any deviation from that will be
unconstitutional. This has already been confirmed in numerous cases.' (Empha-
sis supplied.)
And in paragraph 54.2:
'[I]n our view care should be taken that different tests are not applied to same
sex couples which could be discriminatory, for example, in some of the cases
sare sex couples were required to show that there would be so-called
"maternal influences" the child would be subjected to.' (Emphasis supplied.)
These dicta appear to be contradictory. On the one hand the first
quotation seems to require formal equality between same-sex and opposite-
sex comnissioning parents in the sense that they should be treated in 'exactly
the same manner'. This interpretation is confirmed by the warning, in the
second quotation, that different tests should not apply to same-sex and
opposite-sex commissionmng parents. On the other hand, the realisation that
requiring maternal influences fuom a gay couple would effectively preclude
them from becoming surrogate parents indicates an awareness of the different
contexts applying to gay couples who wish to become parents. This would
require substantive, rather than formal, equality between same-sex and
opposite-sex commissioning couples.
A commitment to substantive equality does not, however, translate into a
legal duty to treat same-sex couples either the same as, or different from,
opposite-sex couples. Instead, it requires close attention to context and that
courts should question and transcend heteronormative legal and social
assumptions. According to Sachs J.
[e]quality ... does not imply a levelling or honogenisation of behaviour but an
acknowledgement and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that
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difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation, stigma and
punishment. At best, it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any
society.' (NCGLE t, Minister ofJustice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para 132,
emphasis supplied.)
'The court's refusal, in Ex parte IH, to require that a gay couple
demonstrate the availability of 'maternal influences' indicates that it is
applying a substantive concept of equality, despite expressing a preference for
formal equality. We argue that this inability to articulate its own understand-
ing of equality is disappointing and, rather than providing clarity to future
courts, it may in fact be the cause offurther confusion.
In addition to this somewhat theoretical point ofe riticism, we also find the
court's application of equality problematic, particularly as found in its
assumptions about same-sex couples. In para 36 Tolmay and Kollapen JJ
observe that [g]ay and lesbian people in a relationship also have little choice
other than to enter into a surrogacy arrangement if they should wish to have a
child genetically linked to either of them'. This statement illustrates the
court s assumptions, first, that the reproductive circumstances of all same-sex
couples are the same and, secondly, that these circumstances always resemble
those of certain gay couples. This is simply inaccurate. For instance, lesbians
of childbearing age usually do not need surrogacy in order to have a family;
they just require a sperm donor (Francie Hornstein Children by Donor
Insenination: A New Choice for Lesbians (1984) 421).
Of the commissioning parents, the court remarked that they 'do not have
children of their own and both being male persons are incapable of having
children that are genetically related to them except via the process of
surrogacy (para 16). Although possibly true of this particular couple. this
remark is an oversimplification and shows lack of understanding of the lives
of all-male couples in general. It is well-known that men who have
relationships with other men may either have simultaneous relationships
with women or may have had heterosexual relationships in the past (see
generally S 0 Murray & W Roscoe (eds) Boy- 14lves and male Husbands:
Studies ofAfrican Homosexualities (1989); S Arnfred (ed) Re-Thinking Sexua/i-
ties in Africa (2004)). Bisexual and transsexual men are also likely to have been
involved in opposite sex relationships in the past, and children may have been
born fiom these. Surrogacy is therefore not the only wax for men to have
biological children when they are involved in relationships with other men.
'The court's assumptions indicate a lack of knowledge of the social and
other contexts which affect the reproductive lives of same-sex couples. If
substantive equality requires us to engage seriously and respectfully with
people's lived realities in order to eradicate stigma and promote an inclusive
society, the judgment in Ex parte WH signals the opposite: while paying
lip-service to the need for treating same-sex couples e.qually it regards what it
perceives as the realities of one sub-group to be the realities of all such
couples and, adding insult to injury, fails accurately to understand the realities
of all-male couples. Perhaps intervention by an anmicus curiae representing
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lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex ('LGBTI') persons would
have assisted the court.
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Two of the considerations underlying the South African prohibition on
commercial surrogacy are the need to protect surrogate mothers' constitu-
tional right to dignity and the principle that the best interests of the child
must be paramount in all matters concerning the child (Constitution, ss 10
and 28(2)). The emphatic prohibition on commercial surrogacy in the
Children's Act is expressed as a prohibition on payiment for the surrogate
mother beyond reimbursement for specified categories of expenses and loss
of earnings (ss 295(c)(iv) and 301). In addition, medical and other personnel
- which woild probably include agencies - may receive 'reasonable
compensation' for their services in relation to surrogacy (s 301(3)).
In their affidavits, the commissioning parents indicated that they had made
the following payments to the surrogate mother: health insurance at R20 400
per year; life insurance at R6 000 per year; and R20 000 for the '[s] urrogate's
various expenditure (transport, maternity, clothes etc)' (para 28). The com-
missioning parents and the agency, baby2mom, both stated that no fees were
paid to the agency 'in contravention of the Act' (para 18) for introducing the
commissioning parents to the surrogate, nor were fees paid to the agency for
any egg donation (paras 25-7). It should be mentioned here that the eggs of
the surrogate mother would not be used for the fertilisation (para 22), but
that the court documents did not reveal the source of the eggs which would
be used. The court held that the origin of the eggs was not important to the
outcome of the case (ibid).
In its judgment the court made much of the dangers posed by commercial
surrogacy, both to the particular surrogate mother and because 'in countries
such as ou~rs with deep socioeconomic disparities and the prevalence of
poverty, the possibility of abuse of underprivileged women is a real and ever
present danger' (para 64). The court noted that no specific details had been
provided about the payment of the R20 000 and that
'there may be a danger that generic payments for expenditure without speciic-
ity may well run the risk of disguising the payment of compensation .... [A]s a
general proposition and in the main to avoid commercial surrogacy (either
directlv or indirectly) the court should, in all instances where an agency is
involved, be fully apprised of all the facts and circumstances relating to the
modus operandi of the agency, the relationship between the agency and the
commnssioning parents, as well as the agency and the surrogate mother.' (Paras
29-30.)
It furthermore warned that '[c]ommercial surrogacy can quite easily be
disguised and payments in contravention of the law can just as easily be
included under the guise of legal and legitimate payments' (para 64). For
these reasons courts who are approached to approve surrogacy agreements
should obtain sufficient information to ensure that the agency does not
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receive payment in contravention of the Act and to ensure that the surrogacy
is indeed undertaken from altruistic rather than commercial motives (paras
66, 67, 72 and 73).
The factual findings of the c.ourt do not, however, reflect a similar degree
of caution about the dangers of commercial surrogacy. The judgment gives
no explanation of the surrogate mother's motivation for undertaking the
surrogacy, and mentions that she contacted the agency as a result of an
internet advertisement (para 26). 'The court also noted that the surrogate
mother 'may not be as privileged as the commissioning parents' (para 21).
The high payments to the surrogate mother, especially the R20 000 reim-
bursements for 'transport, maternity clothes, etc', seem not to have been
questioned at all. 'There were no indications that the surrogate lived very far
away or needed maternity clothes of such luxuriousness as R20 000 would
cover. In the light of these payments and the fact that she did not previously
know the commissioning parents, we would argue that the court should have
been more vigilant. These circumstances raise a possibility that the surrogate
was motivated more by financial gain than by a selfless wish to benefit two
strangers - a possibility which should have been thoroughly investigated.
Instead, the court blandly concluded that the agreement was concluded for
altruistic reasons (para 79). 'This conclusion is questionable in the light of the
facts which appear from the judgment.
Moreover, the court also accepted that the head of the agency engaged in
this process, not for profit, but for altruistic motives and merely 'as an
extension of her core business, being egg donation' (para 25), while 'she did
not receive nor was promised any form of compensation from the applicants
regarding the surrogacy, introduction and/or for any egg donation with regard
to this applicatio' (para 27, our emphasis). In short, the court found, on a
balance of probabilities, that both the surrogate and the agency performed
this rather onerous service for people unknown to them at no gain to
themselves beyond the reasonable compensation for expenses and profes-
sional services allowed for by the law. While such praiseworthy instances of
altruism may indeed occur, the facts of this particular case and the careful
phrasing of the agencies' information about payment renders it possible (or
even likely) that the agency may already have been compensated for the
previous, failed attempt at surrogacy. Despite its dire warnings about the
dangers of commercial surrogacy, this possibility was not canvassed by the
judgment.
In any event, the fact that the agency has not paid the surrogate for her
services does not prove that she has not been remunerated at all. Agencies can
(and have been known to) leave the remuneration of the surrogate to be
agreed between the commissioning parents and the surrogate, while charging
the commissioning parents for the administrative services of introducing
them to a suitable surrogate and for eggs. The literature on the fertility
industry in the United States suggests that this is a strong possibility (see for
instance Susan Ince 'Inside the surrogate industry' in Rita Arditti, Renate
Duelli Klein & Shelley Minder (eds) Test Tube Womeni, 1W/hat Future for
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Motherhood? (1984) 99 at 105-113 and May Gibson 'Contract motherhood:
Social practice in social context' in Alison M jaggar Living with Contradictions:
Controversies in Fem-ninist Social Ethics 9 ed (1994) 402-19).
Other factors strengthen our argument, amongst them the information
posted on the internet sites for baby2moi, the agency involved in this case.
The websites of other surrogacy agencies are broadly similar. 'The following
information for potential egg donors is posted on the baby2mom website:
'Question: Do I get paid to be an egg donor?
Answer: Egg donors do not get paid, they receive a donation.... This egg
donor donation has been established by the Health Department so well [sic]
within the relevant egg donation legislation....
Question: Is it okay if I donate eggs to get the egg donation money?
Answer: Egg donors are angels, so the recipient gladly offers the R5,000
or R6,000 [sic] for the egg donor's inconvenience.' (baby2ioi .bolt s. coi
Page/11602/EggDooor4Q, accessed 30 May 2012.)
And:
'2 Egg donors will receive a cash donation of between R5,000 and R6000,00
[sic] on the day of egg retrieval....
3 In the unfortunate event that the egg donor progamn [sic] is cancelled
because the egg donor has not responded well to egg retrieval, she is likely to
receive less....
4 In the unfortunate event that no eggs are retrieved on the day of egg
retreival, [sic] the egg donor may receive less forher [sic] egg donor help'
(baby2ioi.boltcms.co/iPae/ I 1597/EpDonors, accessed 30 Mav 2012.)
These quotations raise the issue of whether the baby 2 mom pays egg
donors or, as it claims, merely provides a 'donation' as a token of gratitude.
Regulation 11 of the Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biologi-
cal Material tinder the National Health Act 61 of 2003 clearly stipulates that
' [a] person from whose body human biological material is withdrawn may
only be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred by him or her in order to effect
the donation concerned as defined in section 60(4) of the Act' (Notice R177
GG 35099 Reg Gaz 9699 of 2 March 2012, our emphasis). We have not been
able to trace any regulations or other official infomration indicating that the
National Department of Health has officially sanctioned such generous
payments to egg donors -in direct contravention of the regulations.
In temis of contract law, a sale is distinguished from a donation by the fact
that in the fomrer the payment of money is reciprocal to delivery of a merx,
while a donation does not require a counterperformance by the donee.
Moreover, a court will give effect to the real nature of a contract, rather than
the label affixed to it by the parties (Boots Co Ltd V Sonrset W4est Municipality
1990 (3) SA 216 (C)).
The information on baby2mom's website regarding the 'reduced dona-
tion' where no eggs are extracted could be said to indicate that the 'donation',
or at least a portion of it, depends on the agency obtaining the eggs. This
supports the argument that the payment is of the nature of a pretium, rather
than a donation. Nor would these amounts constitute reimbursement for
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reasonable expenses, as allowed for by the regulations. The expenses actually
incurred by an egg donor would vary according to the circumstances of each
donor, for instance travelling and medical costs, tirne needed off work and so
forth. This would generally not be a standard surn as provided for on the
baby2m1oi website. 'There is therefore a strong possibility that, despite being
labelled a 'donation' by the agency, legally speaking the payments to egg
donors may amount to payments for contracts of sale - expressly forbidden
by the re gulations under the National Health Act. In this particular case the
agency denied making a 'donation' to the surrogate for eggs, but in general
these 'donations' together with profits would be recouped from people who
want to use the eggs in order to generate income.
Nothing in the legislation forbids agencies from charging for administra-
tive procedures involved in introduscing potential commissioning parents to
potential surrogates. Yet, in Ex parte 1'H the agency was at pains to
emphasise that they had not received any such payment (paras 25 and 27).
Rather than rendering their claims to have acted altruistically more credible,
this may indicate that claims of receiving no payment for eggs or administra-
tive services may be overstated. We contend that the court should have
probed this aspect more deeply, given its express commitment to preventing
commercial surrogacy.
INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY
The internet advertising material for baby2miom hints at another alarming
development in South Africa and worldwide. One such advertisement states:
'baby2mom offers the world's most atTordable egg donation/egg donor
programs/egg donation program with sorldclass [sic] service and access to
available egg donors - . affordability but obsessed with service and world-
class fertility treatment. South African Egg Donation Solutions offered world-
wide.' (uwvf.ivnt/icvf/baby2iorn-etg-donation-aod-snogay 
-progratnic-o3869. htil,
accessed 30 May 2012.)
'The advertisement suggests that South African fertility clinics and agencies
may be targeting the lucrative international market in assisted reproduction.
The internationalisation of 'reproductive tourism', of which India seems to
be the priniary example (see Amrita Pande 'Commercial surrogacy in India:
Manufacturing a perfect mother-worker' 2010 (35) S(ins 969; Rayna Rapp
'Reproductive entanglements: Body, state, and culture in the dys/regulation
of childbearing' 2011 (78) Social Research 693), has caused concerns about the
potential exploitation of third-world women and the use of national
resources from poor countries to produce children for people from wealthy
countries (see for instance Anne Donchin 'Reproductive tourism and the
quest for global genderjustice' 2010 (24) Bioethics 323).
'The Children's Act attempts to guard against international surrogacy by
requiring that at least one of the commissioning parents be domiciled in the
Republic (s 292(1)(c)). In Ex parte 1'H the commissioning parents were of
Danish and Dutch origin, and had been living in South Africa for one year
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and 17 days when the judgment was handed down. Although they indicated
that they were domiciled in the country and 'intend[ed] to stay here
pemianently' (para 15), they admitted that they had during this year of
residence in South Africa already entered into another surrogacy agreement,
which had been confimed by a court, but which was unsuccessful because
the surrogate became ill (para 17). To enter into two surrogacy agreements
and have them both confimed by the extremely busy courts within a year of
arriving in the country appears remarkable and should have sounded alarm
bells to the court. It raises questions about how the commissioning parents
established domicile so rapidly and whether, given the existence of two
surrogacy agreements in this time, the purpose of their residence was not
reproductive tourism. The judgment provides no evidence that the court
considered this, to our thinking, not unrealistic possibility. If these issues
were indeed addressed in the papers or canvassed with the legal representa-
tives, the judgment would, or at any rate should, have mentioned them.
Lest our concerns about the flouting of the statutory provisions be
dismissed as unrealistic and alarmist, we would remind readers of the other
2011 surrogacy judgment in the South Gauteng division, In Re Confirmation
of Three Sunogate MIotherhood Agreements (supra), in which an attorney
attempted to get three surrogacy agreements confirmed by unorthodox and
'reprehensible' means (para 13). In that case Wepener J remarked upon the
'numerous unconfimed reports in the media indicating that monetary
considerations are indeed a factor in many cases, contrary to the provisions of
s 301 of the Act' (para 22). Given the vulnerability of surrogate mothers and
the desperate desires of many childless couples, courts should be alive to the
real potential for financial exploitation in these agreements and of their duty
to guard against it.
'INFORMAL SURROGACY
Finally, the court mentions 'informal surrogacy' several times, referring to
extra-legal arrangements between family or friends which do not involve
lawy ers or courts and which do not comply with the statutory provisions of
the Children's Act. Particularl, the court mentions that '[t]he Act now
provides a mechanism for many who desire a child and for whom informal
surrogacy is not an option' (para 3). This sentence and others in the judgment
(see paras 31 and 44) create the impression that the Children's Act has created
an alternative, legalised route to surrogate reproduction alongside which
'informal' surrogacy remains an option. This clearly contravenes the provi-
sions of the Act to the effect that 'any surrogate motherhood agreement that
does not comply with the provisions of this Act is invalid. . .'(s 297(2)). The
distinction between infomal, unregulated surrogacy and surrogacy in terms
of the Children's Act is therefore highly questionable.
CONCLUSION
In Ex parte 1W7H the court had the opportunity to provide a legal precedent on
how surrogacy agreements could be handled in the future, but failed to do so.
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The court too readily accepted the assertions made by the parties and failed to
probe the disquieting issues surrounding conmercial surrogacy and interna-
tional reproductive tourism. Moreover. it seems that the court failed to apply
the relevant provisions of the Children's Act to the facts of the case. After all,
the reason why surrogate agreements should be sc.rutinised by the courts is for
them to protect the interests of vulnerable women and potential children and
to implement the very clear statutory prohibition on commercial surrogacy.
Further, in its attempt not to discriminate against sane-sex couples, the
court confused substantive and formal equality by asserting that sane-sex
couples should be treated in exactly the same manner as opposite-sex
couples. Obviously, the different circumstances of same-sex couples would
require that they be treated differently in order to achieve substantive
equality. Fuirthermore, the court appeared to assume that all same-sex
couples are men (thus ignoring lesbians, transsexuals, bisexuals and the like)
and also showed its lack of understanding of the lived realities of gay men.
Surrogacy agreements have far-reaching social effects, and the court
should have not dealt with the matter in such an ineffective way. The
decision therefore offers no real guidance for future cases on the approval of
surrogacy agreements.
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